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!
1. Introduction!

!
Biotech!seeds!have!become!an!enormouslyOvaluable!part!of!the!food!supply!in!the!US!and!
abroad.!!A!substantial!portion!of!soybeans,!corn,!cotton!and!other!agricultural!products!
grown!in!the!US!are!derived!from!geneticallyOmodified!seeds.!!The!genetic!traits!that!give!
these!seeds!their!value—traits!that!confer!resistance!to!herbicide!and!high!yields,!for!
example—are!often!developed!by!large!agribusiness!companies,!with!enormous!research!
and!development!investments.!!The!process!is!technologicallyOadvanced,!timeO!and!moneyO
intensive,!a!risky!investment,!and!subject!to!various!layers!of!regulation.!!The!process!of!
developing!a!new!seed!variety!can!take!15!years!and!require!hundreds!of!millions!of!
dollars!of!investment.!!Regulations!from!the!USDA,!the!FDA!and!the!EPA!can!slow!or!halt!
the!process,!and!international!trade!regulations!(particularly!from!countries!that!ban!or!
severely!restrict!importation!of!GMOs)!complicate!the!control!and!the!commercialization!of!
the!final!products.!
!
In!part!for!these!reasons,!the!biotech!seed!industry—like!all!segments!of!the!US!agricultural!
industry—has!seen!a!substantial!increase!in!concentration.!!Large!scale!is!of!obvious!
benefit!to!companies!engaged!in!massively!expensive!R&D!programs!that!can!achieve!
economies!of!scale!and!thus!lower!costs.!!Meanwhile,!there!are!also!likely!other!vertical!
efficiencies!associated!with!contractual!arrangements!between!various!players!in!the!
transgenic!supply!chain:!
!
Vertical!efficiencies!such!as!reduced!transactions!costs!and!
coordination!achieved!by!exploiting!the!complementarities!
between!traits!and!traited!seed!assets!can!also!reduce!costs.!
Closer,!more!precise!coordination!between!levels!in!the!
transgenic!supply!chain!may!result!in!more!efficient!creation!of!
new!transgenic!varieties!in!increasingly!differentiated!product!
markets.1!
!
Thus!it!is!not!surprising!that!the!period!of!increasing!innovation!has!been!accompanied!
with!an!increase!in!concentration!as!innovating!firms!assembled!the!necessary,!
complementary!assets!to!develop!and!commercialize!their!innovations,!often!through!
vertical!and!horizontal!mergers!and!acquisitions.2!!The!remarkable!gains!in!biotech!seed!
development!since!the!industry’s!infancy!less!than!20!years!ago,!along!with!the!
complexities!of!the!industry!and!our!limited!understanding!of!the!economic!significance!of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Diana!L.!Moss,!“Transgenic!Seed!Platforms:!Competition!Between!a!Rock!and!a!Hard!Place?,”!American!

Antitrust!Institute!White!Paper!(October!23,!2009),!available'at'
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/seed.ashx.!
2!Id.!at!Figure!2.!!While!Moss!happens!to!conclude!that!this!inverse!correlation!is!a!surprise!and!struggles!to!
find!explanations!for!the!seeming!contradiction,!the!proffered!explanations!are!unpersuasive!(or!irrelevant).!!
See!Nicholas!Kalaitzandonakes!&!Bruce!Bjornson,!Vertical'and'horizontal'coordination'in'the'Agro3
biotechnology'industry:'Evidence'and'implications,!29!J.!AG.!AND!APPL.!ECON.!129!(1997)!for!a!more!relevant!
analysis!of!industry!forces.!!
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organizational!choices!in!the!industry,!should!counsel!strongly!against!hasty!antitrust!
intervention!in!the!industry.!!Consumers!enjoy!significant!benefits!from!innovation!that!
must!be!considered!before!responding!too!quickly!or!improperly!to!complaints!about!
increased!concentration,!especially!if!the!complaints!come!merely!from!competitors.!!!

2. The!Economic!Benefits!of!Intellectual!Property!!
a. Incentives!to!Innovate!!

!
Intellectual!property!rights!provide!important!incentives!for!getting!inventions!made!
(inventing)!and!widely!put!to!use!(the!overall!process!of!innovation,!including!invention!
and!its!use).3!!When!intellectual!property!rights!are!characterized!by!predictable!legal!rules!
governing!validity,!enforceability,!and!contracting,!they!help!get!deals!done!among!the!
diverse!set!of!complementary!users!of!intellectual!assets!that!are!needed!to!bring!them!to!
market,!including!inventors,!venture!capitalists,!managers,!laborers,!manufacturers,!
distributors,!etc.!!At!the!same!time,!they!produce!incentives!to!develop!alternative!
technologies!as!well!as!improvements!and!other!derivative!uses.!!In!economic!terms,!
intellectual!property!rights!solve!coordination!problems!and!decrease!transaction!and!
information!costs!to!bring!to!market!new!technologies!and!new!business!models,!thereby!
increasing!competition!and!access,!as!well!as!jobs!and!overall!economic!growth.!!!
!
The!primary!focus!of!the!economic!literature!has!been!on!the!role!of!intellectual!property!
in!providing!direct!incentives!to!inventors!(or!creators)!to!invent!(or!create).4!!This!
function!is!illustrated!by!considering!the!sale!of!ideas!in!the!absence!of!enforceable!
intellectual!property!rights.!!The!sale!of!an!idea!requires!disclosure!to!the!potential!buyer,!
who!will!have!a!difficult!time!reaching!a!decision!to!pay!a!sufficiently!high!price!until!the!
idea!can!be!fully!evaluated.!!In!the!absence!of!enforceable!intellectual!property!rights,!the!
potential!buyer!–!now!with!knowledge!of!the!idea!–!has!no!incentive!to!purchase!or!license!
the!idea.!!This!possibility!deters!the!seller!from!disclosing!the!idea!in!the!first!place!and!is!
known!in!the!economic!literature!as!the!Arrow!Information!Paradox!after!the!work!that!led!
in!part!to!the!awarding!of!the!Nobel!Prize!in!economics!to!Professor!Ken!Arrow.5!!
Enforceable!property!rights!solve!this!problem!by!allowing!the!seller!to!disclose!the!idea!
without!fear!that!the!idea!will!be!legally!appropriated!without!compensation,!and!by!
allowing!the!prospective!buyer!to!avoid!having!to!post!a!bond!or!otherwise!somehow!
credibly!commit!to!paying!later!if!he!decides!the!idea!is!of!value.!!Property!rights!in!the!idea!
thereby!help!provide!important!incentives!to!not!only!produce!the!idea!in!the!first!place,!
but!also!to!disclose!it!to!others.!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!See'generally!WILLIAM!LANDES!&!RICHARD!A.!POSNER,!THE!ECONOMIC!STRUCTURE!OF!INTELLECTUAL!PROPERTY!LAW!

(2003).!
4!Id.!
5!For!Arrow,!the!“fundamental!paradox”!of!information!is!that!“its!value!for!the!purchaser!is!not!known!until!
he!has!the!information,!but!then!he!has!in!effect!acquired!it!without!cost.”!KENNETH!J.!ARROW,!ESSAYS!IN!THE!
THEORY!OF!RISKOBEARING!152!(1971).!

A!second!and!related!focus!of!the!economic!literature!is!the!optimal!tradeoff!between!these!
direct!incentives!to!invent!and!the!ability!of!others!to!put!the!invention!to!use.6!!Because!
ideas!have!the!attributes!of!a!public!good!(use!of!the!idea!by!one!person!does!not!prevent!
others!from!also!using!the!idea),!static!efficiency!considerations!dictate!the!widespread!use!
of!the!idea.!!The!creation!of!incentives!to!produce!inventions!and!other!ideas!through!
property!rights!can!result!in!above!marginal!cost!pricing!of!ideas,!which!can!in!turn!
inefficiently!limit!access!to!and!use!of!the!same!inventions,!from!what!economists!consider!
a!static!welfare!perspective.!!This!implies!a!trade!off!between!incentives!to!invent!and!the!
static!effects!on!use!or!access.!!This!incentiveOaccess!tradeoff!explains!in!general!why!
limitations!on!both!the!scope!and!length!of!intellectual!property!rights!are!appropriate.7!!
The!tradeoff!is!most!acute!when!intellectual!property!rights!confer!significant!market!
power!to!the!holder!of!these!rights.!!!
!
A!third!focus!of!the!economic!literature!is!that!intellectual!property!rights!can!facilitate!
transactions!by!lowering!transaction!and!information!costs.!!Well!defined!intellectual!
property!rights!facilitate!both!the!licensing!and!sale!of!intellectual!assets.!!Such!rights!also!
allow!others!to!avoid!infringement!of!intellectual!property!rights!by!using!nonOinfringing!
substitutes!or!by!entering!a!licensing!or!assignment!contract!with!the!owner.8!!When!
intellectual!property!rights!are!not!well!defined,!they!may!instead!raise!transactions!and!
information!costs.9!!!

b. Facilitating!Commercialization!!
!

i. The!Role!of!Intellectual!Property!Law!!

IP!rights!generally!operate!as!rights!of!exclusion.!!As!a!result,!many!worry!that!their!
enforcement!will!result!in!too!little!use!of!whatever!they!cover.!!Further,!the!subject!matter!
IP!rights!cover!generally!is!understood!to!show!prototypical!attributes!of!public!goods!in!
that!it!is!nonrivalrous!and!nonexclusive.!!Classic!work!by!Harold!Demsetz,!however,!has!
shown!that!private!producers!can!produce!and!sell!an!efficient!level!of!public!goods!under!
appropriate!conditions.10!!Intellectual!property!law!provides!just!such!conditions.!!!
!
Getting!an!invention!made!and!bringing!it!to!market!require!coordination!among!its!many!
complementary!users,!including!developers,!managers,!laborers,!other!technologists,!
financiers,!manufacturers,!marketers,!and!distributors.!Patents!help!achieve!this!socially!
constructive!coordination!by!allowing!those!various!actors!to!interconnect!with!each!other!
like!modules!of!a!larger!system.!!The!underlying!mechanism!depends!in!at!least!three!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6!See,'e.g.,'LANDES!AND!POSNER,!supra'note!3,!at!11.!
7!Edmund!W.!Kitch,!Elementary'and'Persistent'Errors'in'the'Economic'Analysis'of'Intellectual'Property,!53!

VAND.!L.!REV.!1727!(2000).!
8!F.!Scott!Kieff,!Property'Rights'and'Property'Rules'for'Commercializing'Inventions,!85!MINN.!L.!R.!697!(2001).!
9!See,!e.g.,'JAMES!BESSEN!&!MICHAEL!J.!MEURER,!PATENT!FAILURE:!HOW!JUDGES,!BUREAUCRATS,!AND!LAWYERS!PUT!
INNOVATORS!AT!RISK!(2009);!MICHAEL!A.!HELLER,!THE!GRIDLOCK!ECONOMY'(2008);!Michael!A.!Heller!&!Rebecca!A.!
Eisenberg,!Can'Patents'Deter'Innovation?'The'Anticommons'in'Biomedical'Research,'280!SCIENCE!698!(1998).!
10!Harold!Demsetz,!Toward'a'Theory'of'Property'Rights,!57!AM.!ECON.!REV.!347,!354!(1967);!Harold!Demsetz,!
The'Private'Production'of'Public'Goods,!13!J.L.!&!ECON.!293!(1970).!

fundamental!ways!on!the!expectation!that!patents!will!be!enforced!with!strong!property!
protection!and!that!whatever!contracts!are!struck!surrounding!those!patents!will!be!
enforced!on!their!own!terms!as!well.!!First,!the!credible!threat!of!exclusion!associated!with!
a!published!patent!acts!like!a!beacon!in!the!dark,!drawing!to!itself!all!those!interested!in!the!
patented!subject!matter.!The!beacon!effect!motivates!those!diverse!actors!to!interact!with!
one!another!and!with!the!patentee,!starting!conversations!among!the!relevant!parties.!!
Second,!the!widespread!expectation!that!the!patent!and!any!resulting!contracts!will!be!
enforced!motivates!each!of!these!parties!to!reach!agreements!with!one!another!over!the!
use!and!deployment!of!the!technology.!That!bargaining!effect!falls!apart!if!the!parties!are!
unsure!that!the!patent!and!the!related!contracts!will!be!enforced;!if!the!patent!and!related!
contracts!are!seen!as!not!being!enforced,!there!is!significantly!less!interest!in!reaching!
agreement!ex!ante.!Thus!the!fear!of!weak!enforcement!creates!a!disincentive!for!the!
necessary!parties!to!work!together!at!the!outset.!!Finally,!patent!protection!allows!each!of!
these!parties!to!appropriate!the!returns!to!(rival)!inputs!to!developing!and!
commercializing!innovation—!labor,!lab!space,!and!so!forth—without!the!law!having!to!
trace!the!relative!contributions!of!these!multifarious!inputs.!Instead!patents!form!a!
platform!on!which!coordination!and!development!can!take!place.11!
ii. The!Role!of!Licensing!!
!
The!types!of!contractual!restrictions!that!implement!a!limited!patent!license!are!not!foreign!
to!property!or!contract!law!generally,!are!commonly!used!throughout!consumer!society,!
and!are!even!more!common!in!transactions!among!large!commercial!parties.!Consider,!for!
example,!a!typical!lease!for!the!rental!of!real!or!personal!property!containing!a!restriction!
against!subleasing:!Even!the!general!view!favoring!the!ability!to!assign!and!delegate!rights!
and!obligations!in!intangible!assets!like!contracts!fully!respects!the!power!of!restrictive!
terms!in!an!underlying!contract!governing!whether!or!how!such!thirdOparty!rights!in!it!can!
be!created.!!Consider!the!ways!in!which!the!risk!profiles!of!a!short!term!and!long!term!
tenant!are!different!in!a!range!of!ways!that!can!impact!the!price!and!other!terms!of!a!lease!
in!a!range!of!ways.!!For!example,!a!short!term!tenant!may!trigger!higher!transaction!costs!
of!preparing!the!apartment!between!tenants!and!higher!risk!that!the!apartment!will!sit!unO
rented,!as!well!as!higher!costs!of!negotiating!multiple!contracts!for!a!longer!term.!!While!at!
the!same!time!a!long!term!tenant!may!be!more!difficult!to!evict,!more!difficult!to!charge!a!
higher!rental!price,!or!more!likely!to!surreptitiously!sublease.!!Because!courts!recognize!
that!the!parties!will!be!best!able!to!determine!which!terms!best!meet!their!needs!given!
their!own!particular!situation,!courts!generally!enforce!these!contracts!on!their!own!terms!
absent!ordinary!contract!law!defenses!to!formation!(such!as!fraud,!duress,!mistake,!
unconscionability,!etc.).!!!For!similar!reasons,!courts!generally!do,!and!should,!let!parties!to!
patent!licenses!strike!whatever!terms!they!select,!including!field!of!use!and!other!
restrictions.!!!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

11!Henry!E.!Smith,!Intellectual'Property'as'Property:'Delineating'Entitlements'in'Information,!116!YALE!L.J.!1742!

(2007);!F.!Scott!Kieff,!On'Coordinating'Transactions'in'Information:'A'Response'to'Smith’s'Delineating'
Entitlements'in'Information,!117!YALE!L.J.!POCKET!PART!101!(2007),!
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/10/10/kieff.html!!

The!ability!to!license!IP!with!restrictions,!far!from!leading!to!a!reduction!in!the!social!value!
of!patented!ideas,!actually!increases!the!ability!of!the!patent!holder!to!license!them!to!a!
wider!range!of!licensees,!usually!with!different!licensees!electing!to!pay!different!prices!
depending!on!the!restrictions,!with!unrestricted!deals!costing!the!most.!!And!of!course!
price!is!often!not!the!only!important!term!in!these!deals,!otherwise!the!documents!
underlying!the!deals!would!be!incredibly!short,!primarily!focused!on!patent!number!and!
price.!!Instead,!the!deal!documents!are!very!long!because!the!parties!are!able!to!use!the!
foundation!of!a!license!to!a!predictably!enforced!intellectual!property!right!as!a!platform!on!
which!to!build!a!very!significant!set!of!contractual!arrangements!often!allocating!a!range!of!
technological!know!how,!risks,!rewards,!and!other!highly!valuable!nonOpatent!assets.!!The!
net!effect!is!that,!although!each!individual!license!may!contain!restrictions!on!use,!there!are!
more!licenses!and!more!licenses!obtained!on!optimal!terms!by!diverse!licensees,!leading!to!
an!overall!increase!in!social!welfare!derived!from!patented!innovations.!

3. First!Principles!of!Antitrust!Treatment!of!Intellectual!
Property12!
!

Antitrust!analysis!of!intellectual!property!is,!as!Judge!Richard!Posner!has!concluded,!
“sufficiently!informed!by!economic!theory,!to!cope!effectively!with!the!distinctiveOseeming!
antitrust!problems!that!the!new!economy!presents.”13!!Thus!it!is!generally!wellOaccepted!
that!the!fundamental!first!principles!guiding!antitrust!analysis!generally!should!apply!with!
equal!force!to!industries!involving!intellectual!property.!!These!first!principles!include!
understanding!that!monopoly!power!is!a!necessary!precondition!of!any!potential!
monopolization!violation,!that!most!business!conduct!involves!efficiency!justifications,!that!
it!is!difficult!to!distinguish!proOcompetitive!conduct!from!anticompetitive!conduct,!and!that!
the!potential!for!costly!false!positives!warrants!a!humble!approach!to!antitrust!
intervention!that!requires!plaintiffs!to!present!persuasive!evidence!of!actual!
anticompetitive!effect.!!While!these!principles!are!well!established!in!Supreme!Court!
antitrust!jurisprudence!and!modern!agency!enforcement!approaches,!the!primary!
challenge!that!arises!in!such!antitrust!cases!is!to!avoid!the!temptation!to!treat!them!
differently.!
!
Courts!that!adopt!special!approaches!to!address!matters!at!the!periphery!of!IP!law!run!the!
risk!of!crafting!judicial!doctrines!that!inappropriately!override!wellOestablished!bodies!of!
law!that!are!informed!by!longstanding!judicial!and!scholarly!thought!and!consideration!of!
each!area.!Put!simply,!when!considering!disputes!and!transactions!at!the!periphery!of!IP!
law!where!it!intersects!other!bodies!of!law,!some!decisionOmakers!too!often!take!select!
principles!from!each!body!of!law!out!of!their!larger!context!and!legal!framework,!while!
ignoring!other!basic!features!and!principles!of!relevant!legal!regimes.!For!example,!some!of!
the!now!discredited!cases!applying!the!soOcalled!doctrine!of!patent!misuse!overlook!a!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12!This!section!is!drawn!from!F.!Scott!Kieff!&!Troy!A.!Paredes,!The'Basics'Matter:'At'the'Periphery'of'

Intellectual'Property,'in!LISA!N.!TAKEYAMA!&!WENDY!J.!GORDON,!DEVELOPMENTS!IN!THE!ECONOMICS!OF!COPYRIGHT:!
RESEARCH!AND!ANALYSIS!(2005)!159.!
13!RICHARD!A.!POSNER,!ANTITRUST!LAW!256!(2d!edition!2001).!

number!of!considerations!involving!vertical!restraints!of!trade!that!drive!the!present!
conclusion!under!antitrust!law!that!few!vertical!restraints!are!anticompetitive!and!that!
many!are!in!fact!procompetitive.!Such!selective!picking!and!choosing!from!concepts!across!
multiple!disciplines!not!only!creates!uncertainty,!but,!as!suggested,!it!often!gets!things!
wrong!because!it!involves!decisionOmaking!that!is!conducted!without!the!benefit!of!the!full!
diversity!of!contrasting!goals!and!ideas!that!are!ordinarily!discussed!and!considered!when!
decisions!ordinarily!are!made!within!each!particular!discipline.!!!
!
The!same!dynamic!holds!in!the!application!of!IP!principles!in!antitrust,!and!there!is!a!
reflexive!intuition!among!many!courts!and!commentators!to!condemn!as!anticompetitive!
conduct!relating!to!the!use!of!IP!that!would!be!likely!or!even!presumptively!legal!under!the!
antitrust!laws!in!the!absence!of!IP.!!This!latter!dynamic!is!particularly!problematic!as!it!
threatens!substantial!costs,!both!from!the!likelihood!and!the!incidence!of!error.!!

a. Error!Cost!Framework!of!Modern!Antitrust14!!

!
Given!the!fundamental!difficulty!of!identifying!the!competitive!consequences!of!business!
practices!generally,!and!innovations!especially,!concern!with!the!social!costs!of!these!errors!
(“error!costs”)!have!been!a!mainstream!consideration!in!antitrust!policy!discourse!for!the!
last!quarter!century!and!have!played!a!central!role!in!Supreme!Court!decisions!and!the!
design!of!agency!enforcement!policies.!
!
As!even!critics!of!concentration!in!the!geneticallyOmodified!seed!industry!note,!“[t]he!shift!
from!separate!ownership!of!agricultural!biotechnology!and!seed!assets!to!the!development!
of!transgenic!seed!platforms!has!ushered!in!a!host!of!competitive!issues!that!are!still!
relatively!new!to!antitrust!enforcement.”15!!The!concern!is!that!application!of!antitrust!
analysis,!rooted!in!stylized!economic!modelsOO“possibility!theorems”—heavily!dependent!
on!a!narrow!set!of!assumptions!will!result!in!erroneous!enforcement!in!the!face!of!this!
novelty.!!A!modest!safeguard!to!protect!against!this!concern!of!“false!positives,”!is!an!
approach!to!antitrust!that!requires!a!strong!demonstration!of!actual!anticompetitive!effect!
as!a!precondition!for!a!monopolization!violation.!
!
Judge!Easterbrook’s!influential!Limits'of'Antitrust16!introduced!the!antitrust!community!to!
thinking!rigorously!about!the!relationship!between!antitrust!errors,!their!social!costs,!and!
the!design!of!antitrust!rules.!!The!key!policy!tradeoff,!Easterbrook!explained,!was!that!
between!Type!I!(“false!positive”)!and!Type!II!(“false!negative”)!errors.!!Table!1!presents!a!
two!by!two!matrix!laying!out!the!types!of!errors!that!occur!in!antitrust!litigation.17!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14!This!section!is!derived!from!Geoffrey!A.!Manne!&!Joshua!D.!Wright,!Innovation'and'the'Limits'of'Antitrust,!__!

J.!COMP.!L.!&!ECON.!__!(forthcoming!2010).!
15!“Transgenic!Seed!Platforms:!Competition!Between!a!Rock!and!a!Hard!Place?”!supra'note!1.!!
16!Frank!H.!Easterbrook,!The'Limits'of'Antitrust,!63!TEXAS!L.!REV.!1!(1984).!!
17!Table!1!originally!appears!in!David!S.!Evans!&!Jorge!Padilla,!Neo3Chicago'Approach'to'Unilateral'Practices,!
72!U.!CHI.!L.!REV.!73!(2005).!

!Table!1:!Possible!Errors!in!the!Antitrust!Assessment!of!Business!Practices!

!
!
!

Competitive!Impact!!

Illegal!

Legal!

!

Percent!of!cases!
correctly!condemning!
anticompetitive!
practices!!

Percent!of!cases!falsely!
absolving!anticompetitive!
practices!!

Percent!of!cases!falsely!
condemning!legitimate!
practices!!

Percent!of!cases!correctly!
absolving!legitimate!
practices!!

Harmful!to!Competition!

!
!
!
!

!
Not!Harmful!to!Competition!

!

(“false!negatives”)!

(“false!positives”)!

!
From!simple!legal!and!economic!assumptions,!Easterbrook!provided!a!powerful!
framework!to!think!about!the!optimal!design!of!antitrust!rules!in!the!face!of!expected!
errors.!!!The!assumptions!were!as!follows:!(1)!both!types!of!errors!were!inevitable!in!
antitrust!cases,!because!of!the!difficulty!in!distinguishing!efficient,!proOcompetitive!
business!conduct!from!anticompetitive!behavior;18!(2)!the!social!costs!associated!with!
Type!I!errors!would!generally!be!greater!than!the!social!costs!of!Type!II!errors!because!
market!forces!offer!at!least!some!corrective!with!respect!to!Type!II!errors!and!none!with!
regard!to!Type!I!errors,!or!as!Easterbrook!articulated!it,!“the!economist’s!system!corrects!
monopoly!more!readily!than!it!corrects!judicial![Type!II]!errors;”19!and!(3)!optimal!
antitrust!rules!will!minimize!the!expected!sum!of!error!costs!subject!to!the!constraint!that!
the!rules!be!relatively!simple!and!reasonably!administrable.!
!
Immediately!one!can!see!the!importance!of!the!fundamental!insight!from!the!Limits'of'
Antitrust!that!Type!I!errors!are!likely!to!be!more!costly!than!Type!II!errors!because!market!
forces!place!some!constraints!on!the!latter!but!not!the!former.!!Indeed,!this!insight!becomes!
more!and!not!less!important!as!our!collective!economic!wisdom!about!a!new!business!
practice!decreases—when,!in!other!words,!a!challenged!practice!or!setting!is!innovative.!!
All!things!equal,!the!errorOcost!framework!calls!for!a!more!interventionist!antitrust!rule!
when!Type!II!error!costs!are!higher,!there!are!strong!priors!that!the!given!practice!is!
anticompetitive,!and!theory!and!evidence!suggest!a!strong!likelihood!that!the!practice!is!
anticompetitive.20!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18!There!are!really!two!separate!points!here.!!The!first!is!the!inevitability!of!errors!with!decision!by!legal!rule!

generally.!!See!Easterbrook,!supra!note!16,!at!14O15!(reiterating!that!“one!cannot!have!the!savings!of!decision!
by!rule!without!accepting!the!costs!of!mistakes.”).!!The!second!point!is!that!the!likelihood!of!antitrust!error!
depends!crucially!on!the!development!of!economic!science!to!produce!techniques!and!methods!by!which!we!
can!successfully!identify!conduct!that!harms!consumers.!!See'also!Frank!H.!Easterbrook,!Workable'Antitrust'
Policy,!84!MICH.!L.!REV.!1696!(1986).!
19!Easterbrook,!supra!note!16,!at!15.!
20!Multiple!academics!review!the!existing!theory!and!evidence!on!vertical!restraints!and!single!firm!conduct!
more!generally!and!uniformly!conclude!that!the!practices!at!issue!are!generally!proOcompetitive!and!that!
antitrust!rules!should!"slant"!towards!requiring!plaintiffs!to!demonstrate!clear!anticompetitive!effect!before!

!
Innovation!creates!special!opportunity!for!antitrust!error!in!two!important!ways.!!The!first!
is!that!innovation!by!definition!generally!involves!new!business!practices!or!products.!!
Novel!business!practices!or!innovative!products!have!historically!not!been!treated!kindly!
by!antitrust!authorities.!!!From!an!error!cost!perspective,!the!fundamental!problem!is!that!
economists!have!had!a!longstanding!tendency!to!ascribe!anticompetitive!explanations!to!
new!forms!of!conduct!that!are!not!well!understood.!!As!Nobel!Laureate!Ronald!Coase!
described!in!lamenting!the!state!of!the!industrial!organization!literature:!
!
if!an!economist!finds!something—a!business!practice!of!one!
sort!or!another—that!he!does!not!understand,!he!looks!for!a!
monopoly!explanation.!And!as!in!this!field!we!are!very!
ignorant,!the!number!of!understandable!practices!tends!to!be!
very!large,!and!the!reliance!on!a!monopoly!explanation,!
frequent.21!!
!
The!critical!link!between!antitrust!error!and!innovation!is!that,!relative!to!nonOinnovation!
cases,!the!stakes!are!higher.!!While!the!empirical!literature!does!not!contain!reliable!
information!on!the!relative!magnitudes!of!Type!I!and!Type!II!error!costs,!the!wellO
established!empirical!link!between!innovation!and!economic!growth!tells!us!that!the!stakes!
of!error!are!much!higher.!!One!reason!that!antitrust!intervention!in!the!face!of!innovative!
products!is!(deservedly)!uncommon!is!that!new!goods!are!generally!quite!valuable,!and!the!
cost!to!deterring!the!introduction!of!new!goods!and!expenditures!on!innovation,!both!of!
which!are!potentially!costly!and!extremely!risky,!is!high.22!!This!effect!is!perhaps!magnified!
in!the!agricultural!sector!where!the!consequences!of!undue!deterrence!may!be!hunger!and!
starvation!among!disadvantaged!segments!of!the!population.!

b. Patents!and!Antitrust!Market!Power!

!
The!intersection!of!IP!and!antitrust!is!thus!fraught!with!peril.!!The!risks!of!error!are!high!
given!both!the!inherent!uncertainty!of!the!economic!import!of!conduct!surrounding!the!
development!and!commercialization!of!innovations,!as!well!as!the!possibility!of!mistakes!
from!melding!principles!from!two!distinct!areas!of!law.!!The!costs!are!likewise!substantial,!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
condemning!finding!violations.!!See,'e.g.,!James!Cooper,!et!al.,!Vertical'Antitrust'Policy'as'a'Problem'of'
Inference,!23!INT’L!J.!INDUS.!ORG.'639'(2005);!Francine!Lafontaine!and!Margaret!Slade,!Exclusive'Contracts'and'
Vertical'Restraints:'Empirical'Evidence'and'Public'Policy,!in'HANDBOOK!OF!ANTITRUST!ECONOMICS!(Paolo!
Buccirossi,!ed.,!2009);!Daniel!P.!O’Brien,!The'Antitrust'Treatment'of'Vertical'Restraints,'in'REPORT:!THE!PROS!AND!
CONS!OF!VERTICAL!RESTRAINTS!40!(2008),!available'at!
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/Pros&Cons/rap_pros_and_cons_verti
cal_restraints.pdf.!!
21!Ronald!Coase,!Industrial'Organization:'A'Proposal'for'Research,'in!POLICY!ISSUES!AND!RESEARCH!OPPORTUNITIES!
IN!INDUSTRIAL!ORGANIZATION!(Victor!R.!Fuchs,!ed.,!1972).!!For!more!modern!critiques!of!the!industrial!
organization!literature!in!the!same!vein,!see!Timothy!J.!Muris,!Economics'and'Antitrust,!5!GEO.!MASON.!L.!REV.!
303!(1997),!Bruce!H.!Kobayashi,!Game'Theory'and'Antitrust:'A'Post'Mortem,!5!GEO.!MASON!L.!REV.!411!(1997);!
Evans!and!Padilla,!supra!note!17.!!
22!See'generally'THE!ECONOMICS!OF!NEW!GOODS!209!(Timothy!F.!Bresnahan!&!Robert!J.!Gordon,!eds.,!1997);!see'
also'Easterbrook,!supra!note!16.!

as!the!dynamic!consequences!of!stifling!innovation!magnify!throughout!an!industry!and!the!
economy!as!a!whole.!
!
It!is!often!said!that!patents!and!antirust!are!two!sides!of!the!same!coin,!with!patents!
conferring!limited!monopolies!for!the!sake!of!the!incentives!they!confer,!and!antitrust!
reining!in!monopolies!for!the!sake!of!the!deadweight!loss!they!impose.!!But!this!view!of!the!
patent/antitrust!dichotomy!is!problematic.!!While!patents!do!confer!some!exclusive!rights!
over!particular!patentable!innovations,!competition!can!and!does!occur!in!IPOintensive!
industries!because!patent!grants,!when!properly!circumscribed,!confer!exclusivity!only!
over!particular!processes!or!designs,!not!entire!fields!of!innovation.!!In!the!biotech!seed!
industry,!for!example,!several!companies!have!competing!patents!and!competing!products!
that!accomplish!the!same!overall!function!from!the!perspective!of!the!market,!even!if!they!
do!so!via!technologicallyO!and!patentlyOdistinct!approaches.!!The!right!to!exclude!
unauthorized!use!of!one!of!these!underlying!processes!does!not!preclude!competition,!but!
rather!encourages!it.!!!
!
At!the!same!time,!as!we!have!discussed,!patented!innovations!are!monetized!primarily!
through!licensing!and,!as!is!common!in!the!biotech!seed!industry,!even!through!licensing!to!
competitors.!!To!the!extent!that!patent!grants!incentivize!the!dissemination!of!ideas!
through!licenses,!the!claim!of!monopoly!exclusion!resulting!from!patents!is!a!difficult!one.!!!
!
Antitrust!law!has!largely!reflected!these!ideas,!and!thus!patents!do!not!presumptively!
confer!market!power!on!their!holders,!nor!are!licensing!restrictions—properly!viewed!as!
contractual!terms!necessary!to!the!efficient!distribution!of!innovations—presumptively!
suspect.23!
i.

Patents!Do!Not!Presumptively!Create!Market!Power!

!

Modern!antitrust!courts,!enforcement!agencies!and!scholars!have!emphasized!a!desire!to!
ground!policy!in!the!empirical!realities!of!real!world!markets.!The!Supreme!Court!has!
expressed!a!similar!preference!for!antitrust!rules!that!reflect!empirical!reality!over!the!past!
several!decades!which!have!been!marked!by!a!shift!away!from!formalistic!rules!and!toward!
economicallyOinformed!effectsObased!analysis.!!The!Supreme!Court’s!decision!in!
Independent'Ink'represents!an!important!step!forward!in!this!regard.24!!In!Independent'Ink,!
the!Court!rejected!the!longstanding!presumption!of!antitrust!market!power!in!tying!cases!
involving!patented!goods.!!The!decision!is!unequivocally!good!for!consumers!and!
eminently!sensible.!The!presumption!is!at!odds!with!the!longstanding!consensus!among!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

23!It!was!not!always!this!way,!and!the!DOJ’s!infamous!“Nine!NoONos”!of!patent!licensing,!promulgated!in!the!

1970s,!treated!many!licensing!practices!with!deep!suspicion.!!The!Nine!NoONos!have!been!thoroughly!
debunked!and!repudiated!since.!!See!Abbott!B.!Lipsky,!Jr.,!Deputy!Assistant!Attorney!Gen.,!U.S.!Dep’t!of!Justice,!
Current'Antitrust'Division'Views'on'Patent'Licensing'Practices,!!Remarks!Before!the!American!Bar!Association!
Antitrust!Section!(Nov.!5,!1981),!reprinted'in!4!Trade!Reg.!Rep.!(CCH)!¶!13,129!(abandoning!application!of!the!
Nine!NoONos).!
24!Illinois'Tool'Works'Inc.'v.'Independent'Ink,'Inc.,!126!S.!CT.!1281!(2006),!rev’g!396!F.3d!1342!(Fed.!Cir.!2005).!

antitrust!scholars,25!Congress,26!and!the!antitrust!agencies27!that!patents!do!not!confer!
antitrust!monopoly!power.!There!is!virtually!no!authority!defending!the!proposition,!and!
rightly!so.!!!
!
Justice!Stevens’!opinion!for!the!unanimous!Court!should!be!applauded!for!taking!an!
important!step!towards!aligning!a!perplexing!and!muddled!tying!jurisprudence!with!
economic!sense!and!empirical!reality.!!The!opinion!is!an!excellent!example!of!how!modern!
analysis!at!the!intersection!of!intellectual!property!and!antitrust!has!substituted!away!from!
formalistic!presumptions!of!anticompetitive!effect!of!business!arrangements!when!patents!
are!present!toward!a!more!rigorous!and!effectsObased!analysis!incorporating!the!insights!of!
economic!theory!and!empirical!evidence.!!Indeed,!the!empirical!reality!is!that!the!modern!
economy!involves!markets!nearly!universally!characterized!by!product!differentiation!and!
competitive!price!discrimination.!The!link!between!these!two!points!is!clear:!the!patent!
right!guarantees!only!the!absence!of'perfect!substitutes,!and!while!this!guarantee!says!
nothing!about!monopoly!power!–!the!ability!to!control!market!prices!–!it!is!all!that!is!
required!to!price!discriminate.!!The!opinion!therefore!goes!a!long!way,!but!arguably!not!the!
entire!distance,28!to!establish!the!proposition!that!price!discrimination!is!a!normal!part!of!
the!competitive!process!in!the!modern!economy.!
!
Even!more!important!than!the!consumer!benefits!of!overturning!an!anachronistic!and!
economically!perverse!antitrust!rule!for!business!tying!arrangements!involving!patents!is!
that!Independent'Ink!is!consistent!with!a!more!general!trend!in!modern!Supreme!Court!
antitrust!jurisprudence!toward!doctrine!that!is!sensitive!to!the!social!costs!imposed!by!
chilling!the!incentive!to!innovate!and!commercialize!innovation,!and!not!bound!by!
simplistic!and!wrongheaded!approaches!to!competition!policy!that!would!leap!from!the!
mere!presence!of!patent!rights!to!presumptions!that!business!arrangements!otherwise!
known!to!generate!consumer!benefits!are!presumptively!harmful.!
ii. Antitrust!and!IP!Encourage!Dynamic!Efficiency!
!
The!tensions!between!antitrust!and!intellectual!property!have!been!a!frequent!subject!of!
debate!by!legal!scholars,!economists!and!courts.!!Conventional!wisdom!was!that!antitrust!
promotes!competition!and!patent!law!promotes!monopoly,!and!therefore,!the!two!are!
properly!viewed!as!serving!conflicting!goals.!!!For!much!of!the!twentieth!century,!courts!
and!enforcement!agencies!viewed!intellectual!property!as!creating!a!monopoly!and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

25!See,!e.g.,!10!PHILIP!E.!AREEDA!ET!AL.,!ANTITRUST!LAW!¶!1737a!(2d!ed.!2004);!1!HERBERT!HOVENKAMP!ET!AL.,!IP!AND!

ANTITRUST:!AN!ANALYSIS!OF!ANTITRUST!PRINCIPLES!APPLIED!TO!INTELLECTUAL!PROPERTY!LAW!§!4.2!(‘‘an!intellectual!
property!right!does!not!confer!a!monopoly’’);!RICHARD!A.!POSNER,!ANTITRUST!LAW!97–98!(2d!ed.!2001)!(‘‘most!
patents!confer!too!little!monopoly!power!to!be!a!proper!object!of!antitrust!concern’’).!
26!35!U.S.C.!§!271(d)(4),!(5)!(amending!patenting!laws!to!mandate!proof!of!market!power!in!the!tying!product!
in!the!patent!misuse!context).!
27!U.S.!DEPARTMENT!OF!JUSTICE!AND!FEDERAL!TRADE!COMMISSION,!ANTITRUST!GUIDELINES!FOR!THE!LICENSING!OF!
INTELLECTUAL!PROPERTY!§!2.2!(Apr.!6,!1995)!(enforcement!agencies!will!‘‘not!presume!that!a!patent,!copyright,!
or!trade!secret!necessarily!confers!market!power!upon!its!owner’’).!
28!See!Joshua!D.!Wright,!Missed'Opportunities'in'Independent'Ink,!2005O06!CATO!SUPREME!COURT!REVIEW!333!
(2006).!

antitrust!case!law!encouraged!that!presumption.!!Through!the!1970’s,!the!infamous!“Nine!
NoONo’s”!approach!to!intellectual!property!embedded!that!skepticism!into!enforcement!
decisions!and!judicial!thinking!about!intellectual!property!and!antitrust.!!!
!
Economic!learning!soon!would!change!matters.!!The!Antitrust!Modernization!Committee!
Report!(“AMC!Report”)!notes!the!dramatic!reversal!that!would!take!place!over!the!next!
several!decades:!
!
!
The!influence!of!economic!learning!about!the!competitive!benefits!of!intellectual!
!
property!and!the!potential!efficiencies!of!intellectual!property!licensing!and!other!
!
conduct!reversed!this!trend.!In!1981!the!Chief!of!the!Intellectual!Property!Section!of!
!
the!Antitrust!Division!explained!that!because!patents!increase!the!reward!for!
!
research!and!development,!inventions!are!produced!that!otherwise!would!not!have!
!
come!about!(or!would!not!have!come!about!as!quickly);!in!those!cases,!“the!
!
availability!of!a!patent![serves]!only!to!benefit!competition—!to!make!additional!or!
!
less!expensive!choices!available!to!consumers.”!!In!1981!officials!from!the!DOJ!
!
renounced!the!Nine!NoONos.!!The!1995!Antitrust!Guidelines!for!the!Licensing!of!
!
Intellectual!Property!(DOJ/FTC!IP!Guidelines),!issued!jointly!by!the!DOJ!and!the!
!
Federal!Trade!Commission!(FTC),!take!the!view!that!“intellectual!property!licensing!
!
.!.!.!is!generally!procompetitive”!and!should!be!examined!under!the!rule!of!
!
reason.29!
!
The!AMC!Report!goes!on!to!accurately!capture!the!modern!consensus!on!the!relationship!
between!antitrust!and!intellectual!property!rights,!noting!that:!
!
!
Courts!and!the!antitrust!agencies!in!recent!decades!have!evidenced!a!greater!
!
appreciation!of!the!importance!of!intellectual!property!in!promoting!innovation!and,!
!
accordingly,!the!need!to!incorporate!this!recognition!into!a!dynamic!analysis!of!
!
competitive!effects.!Witnesses!and!commenters!remarked!there!is!an!improved!
!
understanding!that!antitrust!law!and!patent!law!are!complementary,!with!both!
!
seeking!to!encourage!innovation!and!competition.30!
!
Indeed,!economic!learning!would!teach!that!any!conflict!between!antitrust!and!intellectual!
property!arises!only!when!analyzing!a!single!aspect!of!the!use!/!creation!tradeoff!without!
regard!to!the!overall!impact!on!social!welfare.31!!Modern!consensus!is!that!antitrust!and!
intellectual!property!rights!are!not!only!compatible,!but!complementary!doctrines!with!the!
shared!economic!goal!of!maximizing!innovation!and!dynamic!efficiency.!!Perhaps!the!most!
obvious!examples!of!how!antitrust!and!intellectual!property!rules!adapt!to!achieve!this!goal!
is!the!immunity!that!antitrust!provides!for!monopoly!in!cases!when!it!results!in!greater!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29!ANTITRUST!MODERNIZATION!COMMITTEE!REPORT!AND!RECOMMENDATIONS!37!(2008)!(citations!omitted).!
30!ID.!at!38O39.!
31!See!Bruce!H.!Kobayashi!and!Michele!Burtis,!Intellectual'Property'and'Antitrust'Limits'on'Contract'in!DYNAMIC!

COMPETITION!AND!PUBLIC!POLICY:!TECHNOLOGY,!INNOVATION!AND!ANTITRUST!ISSUES!229!(J.!Ellig,!ed.,!2001).'

output!than!would!a!fragmented!industry!because!of!economies!of!scale!or!allowing!the!
innovating!monopolist!the!fruits!of!charging!the!monopoly!price.32!
!
Thus,!the!modern!antitrust!view!of!the!intersection!of!antitrust!and!intellectual!property!
rules!is!that!they!“are!actually!complementary,!as!both!are!aimed!at!encouraging!
innovation,!industry,!and!competition.”33!!For!example,!former!Federal!Trade!Commission!
Chairman!Muris!has!explained!that!when!“properly!understood,!IP!law!and!antitrust!law!
both!seek!to!promote!innovation!and!enhance!consumer!welfare.”34!!In!light!of!this!
recognition!of!the!complementary!goals!of!antitrust!and!intellectual!property!to!maximize!
dynamic!efficiency!and!innovation,!the!primary!challenge!in!this!area!is!to!design!rules!that!
foster!competition!and!innovation!and!provide!a!backstop!which!prohibits!clearly!socially!
undesirable!activity!without!deterring!innovation.!
!
One!powerful!example!of!this!approach!has!been!in!the!shift!in!antitrust!treatment!of!
licensing!from!the!aforementioned!Nine!NoONo!approach!of!prohibiting!as!per!se!illegal!
various!licensing!practices!to!the!modern!rule!of!reason!approach.35!!In!addition!to!
elimination!of!these!per!se!restrictions,!and!the!elimination!of!the!market!power!
presumption!in!patent!tying!cases,!in!the!Supreme!Court!has!also!relaxed!the!per!se!
prohibition!against!minimum!resale!price!maintenance!in!favor!of!an!effectsObased,!rule!of!
reason!approach!that!takes!into!account!the!economic!theory!and!empirical!evidence!
suggesting!that!such!licensing!arrangements!are!generally!proOcompetitive.36!!Overall,!
these!changes!in!antitrust!evaluation!of!patents!and!licensing!arrangements!demonstrate!a!
shift!that!reflects!increased!recognition!of!the!social!value!of!patents!and!contractual!
arrangements!between!intellectual!property!rights!holders!and!licensees.!!!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32!See!Verizon'Communications,'Inc.'v.'Law'Offices'of'Curtis'Trinko,!LLP,!540!U.S.!398!(2004)!(“The!opportunity!

to!charge!monopoly!prices–at!least!for!a!short!period–is!what!attracts!‘business!acumen’!in!the!first!place;!it!
induces!risk!taking!that!produces!innovation!and!economic!growth.!To!safeguard!the!incentive!to!innovate,!
the!possession!of!monopoly!power!will!not!be!found!unlawful!unless!it!is!accompanied!by!an!element!of!
anticompetitive!conduct.”).!
33!See!generally,!FEDERAL!TRADE!COMMISSION,!TO!PROMOTE!INNOVATION:!THE!PROPER!BALANCE!OF!COMPETITION!AND!
PATENT!LAW!AND!POLICY!3O9!(October!2003).!!See!also!Atari'Games'Corp.'v.'Nintendo'of'Am.,'897!F.2d!1572,!
1576!(Fed.!Cir.1990).!See'also'R.!Hewitt!Pate,!Refusals'to'Deal'and'Intellectual'Property'Rights,!10!GEO.!MASON!
L.!REV.!429,!429!(2002)!(“Intellectual!property!and!antitrust!laws!share!a!common!objective!–!to!encourage!
innovation,!industry,!and!competition.”).!
34!Timothy!J.!Muris,!Competition'and'Intellectual'Property'Policy:'The'Way'Ahead,!speech!before!American!Bar!
Association!Antitrust!Section,!Fall!Forum!2!(Nov.!15,!2001),!at!
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/intellectual.htm.!!
35!ANTITRUST!GUIDELINES!FOR!THE!LICENSING!OF!INTELLECTUAL!PROPERTY,!supra'note!33!at!§!3.4!(1995)!(indicating!
that!the!agencies!will!use!the!rule!of!reason!except!for!exceptional!circumstances!warranting!per!se!
treatment).!
36!Leegin'Creative'Leather'Products,'Inc.'v.'PSKS,'Inc.,!551!U.S.!877!(2007).!!

4. A!Principled!Approach!to!Antitrust!Analysis!of!the!Seed!
Industry!!
a. This!is!a!business!dispute!and!not!an!antitrust!issue!

!
Appropriate!error!cost!analysis!requires!that!we!are!circumspect!before!engaging!in!
antitrust!enforcement!grounded!in!competitor!claims.!!The!inherent!uncertainty!regarding!
the!economic!consequences!of!conduct,!coupled!with!competitors’!poor!incentives!and!the!
huge!costs!of!error,!counsel!strongly!against!antitrust!proceedings!here.!!!
!
Antitrust!criticism!of!the!US!seed!industry!is!often!directed!at!Monsanto,!and!most!of!this!
criticism!comes!from!a!handful!of!competitors.!!The!American!Antitrust!Institute’s!white!
paper,!for!example,!goes!to!great!length!to!point!out!increasing!concentration!in!the!seed!
industry,!and!to!try!to!explain!away!increases!in!innovation!that!have!occurred!at!the!same!
time.!!But!a!clear!picture!of!the!industry!does!show!that!patents!are!fairlyOevenly!
distributed!among!competitors,!Monsanto!has!a!lessOthanOdominant!share!in!certain!crops!
(soybeans,!for!example),!Pioneer!(DuPont),!Monsanto’s!principle!rival!has!a!large!and!
growing!share!of!the!soybean!and!corn!biotech!seed!markets,!and!that!innovation!
continues!apace,!with!forthcoming!(allegedly)!advances!not!only!in!pest!resistance!and!
yield,!but!in!nutritional!content,!as!well.!!!
!
Meanwhile,!Monsanto!and!DuPont!are!engaged!in!a!protracted!patent!dispute,!and!these!
antitrust!allegations!have!surfaced!significantly!only!after!DuPont!raised!antitrust!
counterclaims!in!that!suit.!!But!that!dispute!is!a!business!dispute!between!sophisticated!
parties!over!the!meaning!of!certain!licensing!terms.!!While!huge!sums!are!at!stake!for!the!
competitors,!it!is!not!clear!that!there!are!social!welfare!ramifications!requiring!government!
intervention.!!One!of!the!primary!criticisms!of!licensing!practices!in!this!industry!turns!on!
the!ability!of!a!biotech!company!to!negotiate!fieldOofOuse!restrictions.!!It!is!no!coincidence!
that!this!is!the!general!area!of!dispute!between!Monsanto!and!DuPont.!!
!
To!the!extent!that!the!government!sees!fit!to!limit!licensing!agreements!in!this!area,!it!has!
implications!for!many!other!sectors!of!the!US!economy!where!IP!owners!choose!to!license.!!
The!ramifications!are!significant,!as!we!have!suggested:!!The!inability!to!negotiate!wellO
crafted!licenses!with!appropriate!terms!is!a!disincentive!to!innovate!and,!more!importantly,!
commercialize!innovations.!!An!allOorOnothing!approach!to!patent!licensing!will!preclude!
licenses!to!strong!competitors!as!well!as!smaller!licensees,!unable!or!unwilling!to!pay!for!
an!unrestricted!license.!!And!this!effect!would!ripple!throughout!the!economy,!deterring!a!
range!of!procompetitive!agreements!and!forcing!a!higher!degree!of!vertical!concentration!
in!markets!where!the!only!alternative!to!unrestricted!licensing!is!integration.!Indeed,!
precisely!because!Monsanto’s!competitors!like!DuPont!also!rely!on!patents!and!complex!
licensing!terms,!in!agriculture!as!well!as!in!other!sectors,!even!these!particular!competitors!
would!be!at!risk!from!such!an!overreaching!antitrust!approach.!!After!all,!there!is!often!a!
private!or!government!actor!willing!to!take!up!the!cause!of!the!next!smallest!competitor,!
and!so!on!down!the!line.!!!
!!

The!Green!Revolution!was!one!of!the!most!significant!humanitarian!success!stories!of!all!
time,!built!on!innovation!and!ingenuity!in!the!seed!industry.!!As!we!have!progressed,!the!
methods!of!genetic!modification!of!our!food!supply!have!evolved,!and,!while!more!is!
possible,!genetic!modification!is!more!expensive!and!more!contentious!than!ever.!!!
!
Meanwhile,!it!is!precisely!this!massive!innovation!and!the!consequent!distribution!of!
intellectual!property!that!will!increase!both!the!productivity!and!quality!(along!many!
dimensions)!of!our!crops.!!The!consequences!of!erroneous!deterrence!of!this!progress!are!
enormous,!particularly!for!the!poorest!and!most!unhealthy!people!on!the!planet.!!!
Moreover,!deterring!the!sorts!of!practices!that!facilitate!innovation!in!the!seed!industry!
would!likely!deter!innovation!throughout!the!economy,!with!furtherOreaching!effects.!

b. Antitrust!Analysis!of!Monsanto’s!Licensing!Restrictions!!

!
Although!a!full!antitrust!analysis!of!licensing!practices!in!the!biotech!seed!industry!is!
beyond!the!scope!of!this!brief!submission,!it!is!important!to!make!a!few!preliminary!
remarks!here.!
!
The!primary!complaint!against!Monsanto!is!that!it!employs!fieldOofOuse!or!“antiOstacking”!
provisions!in!its!licenses!to!anticompetitive!effect.!!But!these!claims!are!not!backed!by!any!
empirical!support,!and!casual!empiricism!of!the!biotech!seed!industry!suggests!that!both!
innovation!and!widespread!distribution!of!benefits!to!consumers,!both!farmers!and!endO
users,!are!common.!
!
Of!particular!note,!according!to!the!USDA’s!own!statistics,!in!1988,!consumers!spent!12.5!
percent!of!their!disposable!income!on!food.!!By!2008!that!figure!had!dropped!to!roughly!
11.6!percent,!despite!the!fact!that!2008!witnessed!the!largest!increase!in!food!prices!—!
roughly!5.5!percent—since!1990.37!!Meanwhile,!the!GAO!performed!its!own!study!of!
concentration!in!various!levels!of!the!food!marketing!chain!and!concluded!that!there!is!no!
evidence!that!increased!concentration!has!led!to!any!“adverse!affects!on!commodity!or!
food!prices.”38!
!
The!complainedOof!licensing!practices,!meanwhile,!have!wellOestablished!procompetitive!
justifications.!!FieldOofOuse!restrictions!are!contractual!provisions!that!enable!a!licensor!to!!
divide!the!rights!to!its!technology,!allowing!it!to!allocate!production!more!efficiently!among!
licensees!and!allowing!it!to!ensure!optimal!use!and!branding!of!its!property.!!As!
Hovenkamp,!Janis!and!Lemley,!make!clear:!“[e]xcept!in!unusual!circumstances,!fieldOofOuse!
restrictions!are!not!troubling!from!a!competitive!perspective.”39!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37!Economic!Research!Service,!United!States!Department!of!Agriculture,!“Briefing!Room:!Food!CPI!and!

Expenditures,!Table!8,”!available!at!
http://ers.usda.gov/Briefing/CPIFoodAndExpenditures/Data/Expenditures_tables/table8.htm!!
38!US!Government!Accountability!Office,!“U.S.!Agriculture:!Retail!Food!Prices!Grew!Faster!Than!the!Prices!
Farmers!Received!for!Agricultural!Commodities,!but!Economic!Research!Has!Not!Established!That!
Concentration!Has!Affected!These!Trends,”!GAOO09O746R!at!p.!3!(June!30,!2009),!available'at'
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO3093746R.!
39!HERBERT!HOVENKAMP,!ET!AL.,!supra!note!25!at!§3.3b5.!

!
In!the!case!of!Monsanto’s!licenses,!the!restrictions,!found!in!licenses!to!competitors,!
prevent!competitors!from!developing!seed!traits!with!similar!functions!to!the!licensed!
traits!and!incorporating!them!together!into!their!own!products.!!One!obvious!
procompetitive!intent!is!to!maintain!quality!control,!where!a!user!of!the!seed!would!be!
unable!to!tell!if!any!bad—or!good—functioning!was!attributable!to!Monsanto!or!not.!!Of!
particular!relevance,!Monsanto!does!not,!at!least!in!its!contract!with!DuPont!that!is!the!
subject!of!the!two!companies’!ongoing!patent!dispute!and!the!source!of!many!of!these!
allegations,!restrict!the!stacking!of!its!traits!with!other!traits!that!perform!different!
functions—only!with!those!traits!developed!by!other!companies!that!purport!to!perform!
the!same!function!(in!this!case,!providing!resistance!to!Monsanto’s!Roundup!herbicide).!
!
At!the!same!time,!antiOstacking!restrictions!can!help!to!preserve!for!a!patent!holder!the!
ability!to!compete!in!other!markets,!ensuring!that!its!own!intellectual!property!is!not!used!
to!preclude!it!from!competition!in!other!areas!or,!in!the!case!of!seeds,!with!newer!traits!or!
combinations!of!traits.!
!
The!extent!to!which!Monsanto!licenses!its!intellectual!property!to!competitors!is!striking,!
and!fieldOofOuse!restrictions!are!essential!to!this!widespread!distribution!of!Monsanto’s!
innovation.!!“In!sum,!one!would!not!ordinarily!expect!output!under!a!licenseOplusOfieldOofO
use!restriction!to!be!less!than!output!with!no!license!at!all,!and!it!could!be!significantly!
greater.”40!

5. Conclusion!

!
One!central!lesson!taught!by!economics!and!political!science!is!that!there!are!a!set!of!basic!
questions!we!should!ask!when!thinking!about!how!to!structure!laws!for!governing!market!
players!using!legal!systems!like!antitrust!and!patent.!!We!should!recognize!that!decisions!
we!make!about!particular!cases!will!impact!how!future!parties!will!engage!in!similar!
situations.!!We!should!fully!expect!that!we!would!not!be!able!to!select!the!true,!correct,!
outcome!in!every!given!case!with!certainty!and!so!should!try!to!be!wary!of!the!costs!of!both!
types!of!errors!in!decisionOmaking:!saying!no!when!we!should!have!said!yes!and!saying!yes!
when!we!should!have!said!no.!!We!should!then!try!to!figure!out!who!is!best!able!to!provide!
and!evaluate!the!information!needed!to!make!a!correct!decision!and!be!vigilant!of!the!
different!ways!that!interest!group!politics!can!drive!these!decisions.!!!We!urge!antitrust!
regulators!to!be!very!wary!about!wading!into!this!area!too!quickly!and!too!forcefully,!if!at!
all.!
!
!
!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40!HERBERT!HOVENKAMP,!ET!AL.,!IP!AND!ANTITRUST:!AN!ANALYSIS!OF!ANTIRUST!PRINCIPLES!APPLIED!TO!INTELLECTUAL!

PROPERTY!LAW!(2004!SUPP.)!at!§33.4.!!
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